the second world wars by victor davis hanson

the second world wars by victor davis hanson is an excellent resource for a complete review and analysis of what we now call world war two.  having been born over 30 years after the end of world war two and having heard my own father (who is 90 years old at this writing) speak of his experiences as well has his older brother's experience, i've always been fascinated with what life must have been like living in the 1930s and 1940s.  i love world war two movies from where eagles dare to patton to saving private ryan and band of brothers (book as well as hbo mini series).  my boyhood fascination with the war has largely been focused on the bombing of pearl harbor and the american efforts on the european western front of the war.  over the years, that fascination has turned to a chilling effect as i realized and comprehended the atrocities of both war in general as well as those specific to world war two.

the reason for the change from boyhood fascination to a chilling effect started in 1993 when schindler's list was released.  i quickly realized how frightening humans can act toward other humans.  other movies that portrayed the holocaust have had a similar terrifying effect.  six million souls lost to extermination!  it is shocking.

then in 2016, i stumbled across a website dedicated to visually showing, by the numbers, the human cost of world war two.  the website is called the fallen of world war ii.  if you have not had the chance, spend some time and even donate to the site.  victor davis hanson, in chapter 19 entitled the dead, cites some stats on the number.  low end estimates are around 50 million, with high end around 80 million.  his personal opinion is around 60-65 million dead.  what is really insightful of the fallen dead website is it shows where and how those millions of people died.  the numbers are mind-boggling when you look at the western front.  but what is haunting are the numbers on the eastern front where there germans and russians fought.  hanson goes into the why of this a bit in his book, in that, when two extreme ideologies meet in war (nazism vs communism) and both styles of leadership are of the mindset of win or die, then deaths add up very quickly.

the hatred between the germans and russians explodes on the battlefield and sieges.  in his sieges chapter, hanson says, "totalitarian ideologies framed the struggle in manichean terms unlike anything seen in the rivalries of the past.  hitler planned a war of nazi extermination to either kill off or enslave the supposedly inferior race of slavic untermenschen of russia and liquidate millions of jews in his eastward path" (p. 309).  and just to provide a bit of context of scale, the number of dead russians from just the leningrad siege were four times greater than all the american dead of the entire war! (p. 313).

between the fallen of world war ii website and hanson's the second world wars, i have gained a much greater appreciation of the epic scale of world war two.  my myopic american view of the war has been greatly disabused and i have a much greater appreciation for the exceptionally dire circumstances the french, british and americans were in by accepting an alliance with a communist state (russia).

the second really important point i learned about world war two, is tied directly with hanson's premise and title of the book.  world war one, as we know it today, was called "the great war" in the 1920s, 30s and 40s.  it really wasn't until around 1942 after japan attacked the united states and germany invaded russia that it turned into a global war.  up to that point, all during the 1930s and up to september 1939, it was largely viewed as a series of border conflicts between hitler and his neighbors.  once japan bombed pearl harbor and germany betrayed their former ally (russia), the war greatly escalated and exploded globally.  existential crises popped up across the world.  only years after, did the great war change names to world war one and the first truly global conflict was dubbed world war two.  which leads to the next point i learned from the book: hitler was equipped very well to win border wars, but he and his staff truly failed to appreciate the massive resources the americans and russians had at their disposal - hitler was absolutely not prepared to fight a global war.

in essence, the allies won due to innovation and production power.  the nazis and imperial japanese were technologically advanced in the late 1930s, but their failure to adapt and establish consistent, reliable production methods (food and war equipment), failed them.  the americans, british and russians, on the other hand, collaborated, innovated, adapted and consistently produced far more than the axis powers were able to.  russian production was moved far to the other side of russia in the ural mountains - far from hitlers bombers (who also never was able to develop a long-range bomber like the lancaster, b-17 or b-29).  american continental soil was never in danger and americans were able to produce and supply not only their army, air force and navy, but also they were able to supply russia with thousands of trucks and transports.  hitler may have thought he could attack quickly and overwhelm europe and russia, but when he was not successful against britain, he blundered big time by moving east to russia, where his armies were met by hoards of russian soldiers and t-34 tanks.  of course, by 1944 and the establishment of the western front, all those resources were spent and hitler could not sustain both fronts.

japan and britain had the largest navies in the world in 1939.  the americans had a sizable navy and adequate air navel power, but no where near the japanese strength.  but when american production power ramped up and japanese production faltered, the tide shifted to the americans.  also, the types of warships the japanese and americans decided to build largely shaped the war.  shipbuilding, coupled with slight changes in strategy in aerial bombing over japan and then eventually the technological innovation of the nuclear bomb forced the japanese to surrender.

hanson also does a great job segueing from end-of-war descriptions to post-war new world order descriptions.  understanding world war two and the end results, enables the student of history to understand world history for the next 70 years.  even today, the world is still reeling from the effects of the first global conflict.  hanson also addresses the historical question of: are 65 million deaths worth a 70 year "peace"?  did we truly get peace for the price of all those dead?  or would the world have been a bloodier place (or not) had hitler not invaded russia and held the gains made up to 1941?

one other thought (they keep coming to me) - churchill entered the world stage at just the right time.  britain was the only country to fight nazi germany from the day they invaded poland to their defeat.  churchill was largely responsible for keeping up the fight when more calls of appeasement and conciliation with hitler.  after having watched darkest hour last month during christmas as well as dinkirk last may, i've grown a desire to find a good churchill biography and read it.

overall - a phenomenal book, one that captures the breadth as well as complexity and detail of the first global war.  he cites lots of statistics and arrives at sound conclusions.  for someone wanting to grasp an appreciation and good perspective of the whole war, pick up this book, read it and refer to it often.

the savior generals: david petraeus

reading the david petraeus chapter was really fascinating in that i was following the events in march 2003 and after.  i watched the news and read the news sites and all that came along with it.  the politics surrounding the iraq war was astounding.  as a nation and congress, we were unified to go into iraq and remove hussein.  the "shock and awe" was amazing.  then came the "mission accomplished" stunt.  then the wheels came off.

we were not ready for what came next - the casualties spiked and we did not know how to handle the situation.  the democrats who were for the war, were now against the war.  bush was trying all he could to stabilize the situation, but no general could do it.

many different strategies were tried, but none were effective.  the only successful area in iraq was in the north under the command of petraeus.  he was "perfect" for the assignment is almost every conceivable way.  as vdh put it, "whether consciously or not, david patraeus for two decades had been preparing himself neither for conventional warfare nor for counterterrorist special operations - nor even for classic jungle or rural insurgency.  instead, he had prepped for large-scale postbellum occupation and reconstruction in highly urbanized, extremely hostile populations - exactly what iraq would be like in 2003" (p. 224).

his plan was to oversee "the reestablishment of everything from the urban university to the city council.  petraeus disbursed millions of dollars to more than four thousand projects ('money is ammunition') - often without the oversight of paul bremer, the head of the coalition provisional authority, who had been monitoring civil affairs for the year after may 2003" (p. 225).

once put in charge of the whole theater, he implemented his plan throughout the entire country - and it worked.  he gained the confidence of the people and they were able to see his vision which enabled them to fight long enough to stabilize iraq.  the plan was initiated in 2007; and by december 2011, when all american troops had withdrawn, not one u.s. solider had died.

there is a lot more to petraeus' plan than his two-decade preparation and schooling.  there had to be a way for the plan to make it to the president's desk so that it could be approved.  again, this is where petraeus seemingly shines.  vdh describes petreaus as excellent in every imaginable assignment; unmatched intelligence and academic preparation; and ambition.  petreaus developed "strong personal friendships with high-ranking officers, all the while showcasing his organizational and intellectual skills at the company, battalion and brigade level" (p. 222-223).  his "rivals" discounted his abilities because of his well-connectedness.  but this well-connectedness is what allowed the plan to reach the right ears.

the legend of petraeus grows when you read about his two near-death experiences - surviving an accidental bullet to the chest as well as surviving a parachute landing when the parachute did not open.

the petreaus chapter reminded me a lot of themistocles and belisarius.  all three of them were dynamic and had qualities that only they possessed which allowed them to "save" a war for their leaders.  without them, the wars would have been lost.

as a post-script, it's been two years since the troop withdrawals from iraq.  up until very recently, the peace in iraq has been good.  however, a quick search produces the following headlines:
- iraq suffers worst year of violence since 2008
- iraq sees highest annual death toll in years

no doubt the situation would be far worse had it not been for petraeus, but it is appearing the violence is now creeping back in barely two years after the u.s. withdrew.

the savior generals: matthew ridgway

much can be found on the internet about matthew ridgway.  he died during the summer of 1993, when i was probably at a high school basketball camp getting ready for my senior year season.  i had never heard of him until i read the savior generals.  i may have heard mention of his name, but if anyone came up to me and asked me who matthew ridgway was, i would not have been able to give an answer.

yet, my life and many others, is influenced by what he did for 100 days in korea.  today, i spend a lot of time fiddling around, texting and talking on my samsung phone.  two summers ago, we were all entertained by gangum style.  many people love and drive hyundais.  all the people in south korea can live their free lives because of those 100 days ridgway spent regaining territory and saving people living south of the 38th parallel.

what was so special about ridgway that gave him the capacity to save the korean war?

he lead from the forward.  he was a soldier's soldier.  he dressed like the soldiers he lead.  he kept a grenade and first aid kit on him all the time - giving way to the name iron tits.

he didn't alienate mcarthur.  he was savvy enough to not speak ill of mcarthur.  he was also savvy enough to follow his civilian leaders back in washington d.c.  he installed competent colonels below him and allowed the less-competent to have desk jobs back in the states.  he also ensure that when he communicated to his leaders, they in turn did not leak any information to the press.

he gave the troops a reason to fight.  he gave them a vision about what the world would be like if the chinese communists were left un-checked.  he talked of commitment to allies and to the recently formed united nations.  he spoke of congress funding the war.  he even put the why in the context of the survival of western civilization.

he changed tactics.  he consolidated the line.  he fought at night and had air superiority.  his supply lines were reliable.  he also knew that the communists would not be able to keep their supply lines in good shape

as i read this chapter, i got the impression that mcarthur just left the troops to their own and that they were set adrift and disorganized once the communists came pouring down the peninsula.  all that the military really needed was a solid, steady hand - and in ridgway, they got that.

one final parting thought about ridgway.  it seemed the consensus, prior to ridgway taking command, was that the united states could simply drop a couple of nukes on korea and be done with it.  but others, including ridgway felt that nuclear escalation was not the best way.  russia has exploded nukes of their own - it was the dawn of the cold war - and nuclear escalation was a real risk.  sure millions ended up dying the old fashion way, but had nukes been uses, my guess is that number would have been far higher.

the republic of pirates by colin woodard

the republic of pirates by colin woodard is the best pirate book i've read.  it was detailed and placed the right amount of emphasis on historical facts without drowning the reader in dates, names and places.

highlights
for me, there were a few things that stood out as well as a few things that i was curious to learn about.

first off - why did people turn to piracy.  this book answers that question quite well.  privateering was essentially government-endorsed piracy.  so when the wars between france, england, spain and the other countries ceased, so did the privateers income.  and not only that, but the reader must also realize that the sailor's life was practically worse than a slave's life.  this was the other's other point about why people turned to piracy.

one example the author used to illustrate how bad a sailor's life was, was about this young boy who the captain beat quite savagely for 17 days!  he beat him, whipped him, made him eat his own stool and when the boy finally spoke, he asked for something to drink.  the captain ran to his quarters and then returned with a cup of his own urine and made the boy drink it.  the boy finally died.

so, the lack of authorization to privateer at war's end and the abuses suffered by many, some sailors were practically forced to piracy in order to survive.

the author also goes into some detail to tell the story and legend of henry avery.  this pirate lived a couple of decades before the caribbean pirates and probably inspired many of them to turn to piracy.

another reason for piracy had to do with the english government.  this was one of those new things i learned.  when the house of hanover assumed power, many loyalists to the house of stuart became pirates.  in fact, some pirates disagreed with each other because some pirates wanted to attack english interests while others did not.

in summary, each pirate had his reason for piracy.

the democracy of the pirates was quite interesting.  although the book was marketed to indicate that the caribbean pirates were actually early american revolutionaries, the book didn't quite make the connection.  there was no evidence that some pirates eventually contributed ideas to the american revolutions.  true, the form of democracy the pirates practiced was revolutionary, but i didn't see any other strong connection to the american revolution.  in fact, it seems the british citizens in america were the most strong-willed people who had the greatest effect on the downfall of the golden age of piracy.

woodes rogers - what a tragic life.  his story is interesting and sad, but, again, he didn't come across as the man who brought down the pirates.  the subtitle of the book is: being the true and surprising story of the caribbean pirates and the man who brought them down.  woodes rogers is apparently that man.  but in the book, his role wasn't as strong as the sub title would suggest.  true, he had a vision to reform madagascar and the pirates there; and true he lead a company to the caribbean to end piracy, but when he actually got there, he seemed way more reticent than expected.  the royal navy abandoned him shortly after arriving at nassau.  the people he had to work with were lazy and ultimately he was afraid vane and the other pirates would return to kill him.  sadly, after all his money was spent, he was cast into debtors prison and eventually died and was buried in nassau.

most of the pirates expired around 1718-19.  but the one pirate who outlasted them all was charles vane.

links and other info
first off, read the book - it's worth the read.

secondly, visit his website: http://www.republicofpirates.net/

thirdly, nbc is doing a mini-series on blackbeard which will be based off woodard's book.  nbc began filming it in puerto rico about a month ago (link).  the series will be called crossbones starring john malkovich.  i'm looking forward to that!

the savior generals: william tecumseh sherman

i've already reviewed a previous chapter about sherman in another book written by vdh (link here).

the main point the savior generals makes that is different from the soul of battle is sherman's concept of total modern war.  let me begin by quoting sherman along with hanson's assessment.

sherman said, "they dared us to war, and you remember how tauntingly they defied us to the context.  we have accepted the issue and it must be fought out.  you might as well reason with a thunder-storm.  war is the remedy our enemies have chosen."  sherman was a "missionary ... bent on teaching the entire south his version of a moral lesson."

hanson further assesses sherman, "no civil war commander possessed a more astute appraisal of the nature of contemporary warfare, how to form and pursue grand strategy, and the critical nexus between war, civit society, popular support, and electoral politics.  and few american generals have since."

words to describe sherman's thoughts on war: modern, total and merciless war; cruelty, hell, ruin, howl, smashing, breaking and ravaging.  in sherman's words, 'the only principal in this war is, which party can whip.'  he further states, 'i propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the south, and makes its in habitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms.'

on actual fighting, sherman chose a different calculus.  while grant looking only at body count and population base, sherman focused on the north's superiority in many other aspects: in manufacturing 23-1; in arms production 10-1; in rail and telegraph infrastructure 2-1 ... these stats bolstered the known population ratio 22-9.  sherman chose to focus on the prior stats rather than the latter, especially in light of the north's public opinion of the death rates grant was suffering.

it's funny how many native southerners still feel slighted by what sherman did.  there is no doubt the natives still value gallantry over the value of life itself.  sherman rather chose to value life and by stabbing at the pride of the south, won a war and saved a nation.

the savior generals: belisarius

flavius belisarius: the man who almost reunited the western and eastern roman empire; the man who saved byzantium time and time again and who allowed it to endure 900 years after he left the earth.

who knows what the world would be like had his emperor justinian allowed belisarius more room and resources in the mission to reunite the old empires.

in his second chapter in the savior generals, hanson delves into the life and battles of belisarius and how he saved his emperor time and time again.  these two men's destinies would forever be linked.

let me first quote a paragraph from toward the end of the chapter.  this paragraph summarized the three decade-long mission that justinian envisioned and how his best general - belisarius - almost single-handedly attained that mission.  "a thirty-year career (529-59) saw the last of the romans fighting to save the beleaguered eastern empire in mesopotamia against persians, only to return home to rescue his emperor justinian from the nika riots in the hippodrome.  then he left for north africa and in months destroyed the centurylong vandal empire whose ravages had so dominated the last thoughts of saint augustine.  after that he sailed for sicily, and for a time reclaimed the idea of a roman italy from the mediterranean to the po - only to go eastward again to meet the persians, and then back again to a collapsing italy, and then back to constantinople to internal exile, trials, and humiliation, only while in forced retirement to save the city from a raid of huns - and earn a final rebuke."

in each of the campaigns, belisarius was able to overcome hordes of forces with a very small force.  he was extremely smart and savvy in his approach in out-smarting the enemy.  much like i did with themistocles, let me list out the words that were repeatedly used to describe how belisarius accomplished his mission over and over and over again.

calm in battle, knew difference between tactics and strategy, skilled in counterinsurgency, winning the hearts and minds of local populations, restraint, tactics-morale-generalship, learned to carefully deploy his limited forces against numerically superior opponents, show both force and mercy to locals, did not rashly commit his outnumbered forces, methodic, moderation brings salvation, insurgency, audacious, hit enemy hard and quickly at opportune times, he is quoted as saying "not by the number of men, and not by the measure of one's body, but by the valor of the soul, war is decided", popular icon, mythic status, legendary character, personal habits, clemency, honesty, lenient, saintly conqueror, personally attended his wounded, replaced lost equipment of his soldiers at his own expense, treated personal property sacrosanctly, avoided alcohol-womanizing-bribery, resilient, dynamic, tactical brilliance, personal magnetism, faithful, planner, constantly sought to adopt, improvise, and invent to make up for what he lacked in manpower, usually lost small and won big, confident, not susceptible to panic, neither vain nor prone to softness.

what amazes me is his character.  after all the battles he fought for justinian, he never sought to overthrow him.  it appears there were always rumors that belisarius sought power and for that justinian would always undercut his best general, but belisarius never took advantage.  even when he was old and was recalled out of retirement to fight off the huns - if there were ever an opportune time to take command for himself, this would be it - but he did not.  he was always in the service of his country and emperor.

vdh and other historians wonder "what if" the plague that hit the empire at the worst time had indeed not hit them; and if justinian would have used belisarius to the fullest extent if somehow the old roman empire were reunited - what the world would look like today.  instead, the western empire fully crumbled and the eastern empire was able to survive another 900 years - long enough for the renaissance to begin.

the savior generals by victor davis hanson: themistocles at salamis

it never fails ... every time i read a victor davis hanson book, i feel smarter.  more importantly, i learn something new almost every time i read one of his books.

this book is about five generals who didn't start or end a war, but rather who saved wars from being lost.

the five generals are themistocles, flavius belisarius, william tecumseh sherman, matthew ridgeway, and david patraeus.

i read this book fairly quickly while on vacation this year and so therefore did not get a chance to really soak it in.  now, i'm reading it a second time through to understand better why and how these savior generals were able to do what they did.  i was going to do one big post, but have decided to consolidate my summary as i finished each chapter.

themistocles at salamis

vdh sets the scene by describing the persian hordes and xerxes running ram shod over the greeks.  no persian army had ever extended so far into greece.  the great spartan king leonidas (who everyone is familiar with because the story of the 300 is told and re-told) is dead.  yes, that was a brave fight by the spartans at thermopylae, but now athens and the rest of greece were facing annihilation.

in steps themistocles with a daring idea ... empty athens and place the entire fate of greece in the hands of the athenian navy to fight the persians instead of retreating to sicily.  the navy parked in the straights of salamis and then essentially tricked the persians into fighting.  once the persians engaged the greeks at salamis, it was all over.  the smaller, more maneuverable ships smashed the lumbering persian navy to bits.  xerxes and his hoardes were sent packing back to persia.  xerxes left mardonius to try and 2nd and 3rd offensive.  but mardonius was eventually "crushed" as well by the 70,000 greeks and thus greece was assured freedome from persia.

many historians agree about the impact of the battle of salamis on the world's history - it allowed greece to continue to grow as a culture, directly impacting western civilization history.

a number of things allowed for the victory at salamis.  sure, the greeks had their backs up against the wall, but it really was the cunning, ego and drive of themistocles that allowed athens and sparta to win.

first was themistocles background and heritage.  this guy was a scrapper.  he had no rich parents to dote on him. he fought and he used every means he could to get his way.  let me list several words vdh used to describe themistocles: outsmarted the betterborn, intelligent, ruthless energy, studied and prepared for more diligently than did his advantaged rivals, mobile and serpentine mind, rascally busybody, clever, limitless troublemaking, multifacted leadership, diplomat, calm in battle, unabashed cunning, deceit, the most gifted strategist that classical antiquity ever produced, arrogant, absolute confidence in his own wisdom and leadership, schemed to ostracize his rivals, faked omens to frighted the more pious into his fold, unprincipled behavior, rogue, foresight.

second, in light of the finding of silver in a mine, themistocles was able to convince the people to invest in a navy - to give the silver coins to the lower class and let them participate in the defending of their country.  to offer another vdh quotes, "he somehow persuaded the assembly to build enough ships to ensure a fleet that would reach two hundred triremes.  how a radically democratic politician could persuade his own constituents to pass up such easy money in the here and now in order to invest in an unproven navel program against a distant enemy, we are not told.  but themistocles' navel law proved a monumental turning point for athens, not unlike, in the american experience, the passing of the selective training and service act of 1940 that squeaked by in the house of representatives in august 1940 by just one vote - and just in time, on the eve of war."

third, going back to the character of themistocles, he not only was able to get his navy, but then was able to convince the people not to flee to sicily, but to fight at salamis.  once there, he was able to deceive the persians into pursuing the greeks at salamis and even without their entire force.  he tricked xerxes into sending his best contingent forces to chase the greek retreat - which never came.  themistocles was then ale to smash the persians to bits at salamis to their "utter and complete ruin."

the aftermath of themistocles' life is a bit sad.  the same attributes which helped him be a savior for his fellow greeks also contributed to his downfall.  he was forgotten and eventually ended up in persia where he presumably was going to be forced into service of the persians to fight the greeks, but not before he committed suicide.  vhd also goes on to demonstrate that athens fully embraced themitocles vision of an athenian navy, even though they would not admit it was because of themistocles.

i'll conclude with the vdh conclusion, "quite simply, without the savior general themistocles, the world as we know it today might have been a very different place indeed.  victory at marathon in 490 had alarmed themistocles while most other rejoiced.  defeat at thermopylae had encouraged him when most greeks fell into abject despair.  before salvation at salamis there was no free greece.  after themistocles' victory, there were soon to be few foreign enemies in the aegean.  his dream of an ascendant athenian maritime was assured - and yet along with it a deadly rivalry with sparta on the horizon."

The End of Sparta by Victor Davis Hanson

My pace of reading books has slowed tremendously.  I was just reviewing the last several books I've read ... last year at this time, I was still reading the Patrick O'Brian books and had about 5 books to go to finish the series before the end of the year.  This year, I've only managed to polish off about five books, yet here we are in the 10th month.

A couple of things have contributed to the slow-down.  I got off to a great start with End of Sparta, but then the book just didn't hold my interest.  Along with that was our very long summer trip coupled with the fact that I moved work locations and can no longer take the bus into work  ... I no longer have those two hours a day to read.

But over the last two weeks, I've taken this book with me everywhere I went and read while I had time.  I read it more at night as well as during lunch.  Today, I finally finished it ... after four months!

It was a good book.  It started off really good; slacked considerably in the middle and picked up a bit toward the latter part and in the end.  End of Sparta is about the Battle of Leuctra and then the first invasion into Sparta to free the helots.

I found the discussion on phalanx tactics used in the Battle of Leuctra to be quite fascinating.  The wiki entry for the battle does a good job explaining the change in tactics and how that change won the battle.  Hanson does a great job setting the scene up for that change in tactics.

The aftermath of the battle sets up a number of sub-plots for the rest of the book.

Then after the battle, the book slows considerably as the long wind-up for the invasion begins.

They finally decide to invade Sparta and break them forever and when the begin to muster, the book becomes more interesting again.

They break the Spartans, free the helots and help them begin their own democracy.  Of course, liberty is never easy or clean and there is consternation on the part of Epaminondas' army about this.  They figure it will take a few more years for the helots to work things out ... after all, they've been in slavery for over 300 years.

There are a few dialogues and passages in the book that I found interesting and I'll copy those here.

The first one comes from when they armies are mustering.  The main character, Melon, is addressing some of the men, and one of them asks him a question.

"So, Melon, do you really believe our Epaminondas should have settled up with the king?  Do you think his harsh words caused a war?"

"Melon frowned and went on, though he sensed his general was not serious, was teasing rather than learning from him.  "Of course not, my general.  Name a war, Pelopidas, that was an accident - just one that broke out over a wrong word."  He was soon stammering, worried that a big man like Pelopidas, leading an army to war, had little idea why they were at war at all.  So Melon pressed him further.  "Listen, my commander.  The men of the Peloponnesos invaded our land because they thought they could.  And, by the gods, we had done nothing to persuade them otherwise.  Why not?  We lost Koroneia.  We stumbled at Nemea.  Tegyra was only a small victory.  For years when you build women's barricades rather than raise shields chest-high, you send a message: that lesser men either cannot or will not keep the Spartans out."  Melon found his words were clearing his own head, putting into some sort of order what he knew in his breast.  He could not have stopped if he wished to.  "So for our part, why do you think Boiotians march this morning?  Only because Leuktra taught us that we could - and these red-capes to the south cannot keep their enemies our like they have the past seven hundred years.  Had we lost at Leuktra, not a northerner would be in the ranks with us today."

"Melon, the lone vine pruner on Helikon, had an audience and so he lectured the general on why his army was following him.  He thought states were like people, and knew people well enough up on Helikon - both how to keep the bad off his land and to enlist the good to help him.  "Most men have no belief, either good or bad.  They follow only the winners.  So they claim we are liberators and follow you, Pelopidas, because they think you can do what you promise.  If you cannot make them rich, then at least make them proud to lord it over the losers.  But stumble and most will damn you not just as weak, but as bad also.   Remember Backwash in the assembly.  Just like at Leuktra, if we win, he'll claim us as disciples.  Lose - and he will put the nooses around our necks.  Back home, right now he's waiting and tapping his foot as we march here.  Most men are like that: They pass on risks to be safe and liked."  (pp. 349-350)

And then there was this passage regarding thoughts on the price of victory ...

"Victory, the wealth of peace, proves as deadly to states as does defeat.  Is that man's doom?  That as we struggle to plane down the edges for the young, old men forget that their own blisters and cuts from these knots and burls made us the savvy carpenters we are?  That smoothing the splintery grain for our children only ends up smoothing them, so that they know nothing of the rough to come?  That in our wish to be good we ruin those who we wish to help, because we cannot let them suffer as we did when we have the power or the wealth to stop it?  That law of iron explains the fall of families and the poleis as well.  Did their Pythagoras have any answers for all this, since - Melon knew - his vanishing Zeus did not?"  (pp. 353-354)

The last section I marked, I marked because I read on the wiki entry for Epaminondas that some history critics felt that he did more harm than good.  Although his intent was to free the helots, he in fact, according to the critics, left all of Greece in disarray and vulnerable.  And by the time Phillip of Macedon came to power, and then later his son Alexander the Great, they were able to quickly and decisively conquer all of Greece.

Seemingly in response to all of that, Hanson had this to say in chapter 36: "Alkidamas turned to them and looked over at Melon.  'Are we ready for our climb up to the sanctuary?  Don't worry about our Melissos or whatever his name was or shall be.  I too believe that he may not quite be a killer, although he proved to be a killer enough still.  We did our best to tame him so he wouldn't learn just our warcraft but also the rule of law, our nomoi, as well and the voice of Pythagoras, which I think I heard in him beneath his strange speech.  What he does with that knowledge rests on his soul, not ours.  The One God sorts it all out in the end.  Enough; each man fights the battles of his own day.  Ours are mostly over, and his will begin soon." (p. 415)

You would have to read the book to know that the Melissos he refers to is Phillip of Macedon who served under and learned from Epaminondas as a young man.  He later returns to Greece and wins a decisive victory over Athens and Thebes at the Battle of Chaeronea.

And one last note ... a monument of a lion was erected at the Battle of Chaeronea (wiki link here).  Earlier in the book, Hanson envisions two monuments of lions erected at Messene - representing Chion and Proxenos.

The Soul of Battle Part 3

I finally finished the 416 pages of The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny by Victor Davis Hanson.

The third part was about George S. Patton.

Let me first start off with noting some pages that I earmarked ... these quotes really struck a chord with me.

A quote from the Iliad: "Fate is the same for the man who holds back, the same if he fights hard.  We are all held in a single honor, the brave with the weaklings.  A man dies still if he has done nothing, as one who had done much." - Homer

This next quote shocked me.  Hanson had been discussing extensively the short-falls of Eisenhower and Bradley and the other generals - how they would not listen to Patton, but that history has since proved Patton was spot on with his assessments, strategic plans and tactics, time and time again.  He should have been the supreme allied commander in Europe.  And just what did it cost the world for not listening to Patton?  This is the shocking thought Hanson describes, "we should keep the issue of urgency in mind.  Patton's entrance into Germany meant - whether or not his infantrymen knew the full extent of Nazi atrocity to the east - not merely 'the end of the war' and a cessation of killing between Germans and Americans, but rather a halt to the entire Nazi industrial plan of killing innocents.  When he stopped, thousands died; when he advanced, the day of salvation was nearer."

Just how much life could have been saved had Patton been allowed to continue into Germany in August 1944? Hanson continues, "more Jews would be gassed from the time Patton closed in on the German border in late summer 1944 until the May 1945 surrender than had been killed during the entire first four years of the war."

That quote has spooked me ever since I read it.

They called him Blood n Guts because of his bombastic way of speaking, but in fact, had he been allowed his way, blood and guts of millions would have been spared.  Along those same lines ... I don't know if this analysis has been performed, but Hanson seems to make the point that if Patton had his way, the European war would have been over in the fall or winter of 1944 instead of May 1945.  If that is the case - had we won the war in 1944 and then turned our full attention to Japan - would the war in Japan had ended before August 1945?  Before the atom-bombs were dropped?

Anyway - the book was amazing - I could read Hanson all day.  The amount of knowledge in that guy's head is mind-boggling.  Sometimes I wish I could have discovered him in high school - I would have probably considered a different major in college after reading his books.

His epilogue summarizes the point of the book well.  In all the history of the world, three armies rapidly assembled; were convinced that what they were going was morally right and then they went out and accomplished the mission - destroying tyranny.  Each army was perhaps the most deadliest army in the world at that time - frightening many.  But when the mission was accomplished; they laid down their weapons and went home just as quickly as they took them up.

The next book in the list is the last of the Millennium Trilogy: The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet's Nest.  We'll be spending the day at the beach on Saturday - I might be able to get a lot of reading in then.

Bombers Over Houston!

We've seen lots of WWII airplanes fly over our home.  I am a little kid when it comes to WWII planes.  I am used to hearing the commercial jets fly over as they land at George Bush, so when I hear the deep rumbling of a WWII plane, I run outside to take a look.  We usually hear them when Wings Over Houston air show is running (October).  But every once in a while, we get one that flies over at times other than October.

All the ones I've seen thus far have been fighters.  Today I heard the big rumble of a B-17.  I grabbed the camera and ran outside and snapped a shot.

Someday, maybe I'll be able to afford taking a flight on the B-17.

The Soul of Battle Part 1

I started reading The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny by Victor Davis Hanson.  This book has been in my queue for quite a while.  It is divided into three parts, each about a military general Hanson admires: Epaminondas, Sherman and Patton.

I've decided to provide a quick summary of each part as I finish it.

I just finished Epaminondas last night.  I've read other Hanson books before and have read bits and pieces about Epaminondas.  But after I read the 120 pages about him in this book, I was left hungering for more about this incredible person.  The Greek and Persian history is drenched in conquest and continual war.  You often hear about the Spartans and the Athenians.  But rarely do you hear about the Thebens and their decade of liberation.

The Wikipedia entry on Epaminondas (if you want to hear how to pronounce his name, click here) is very interesting and provides a lot of information and historical background.  I learned quite a bit more about him reading the wiki entry after having my interest piqued by Hanson.

As usual, I found Hanson's writing amazing.  I love the way he writes and describes things.  Every time I read one of his books or articles on the web, I get this swelling feeling of pride in Western culture and civilization.  His descriptions of Epaminondas and his BC 370-369 winter liberation of Peloponnesia were very enlightening.

Before reading this first part of the book, I didn't know much about what his latest book was going to be about (The End of Sparta).  But now that I know the context of this book, I am even more excited to read it.

The next part will focus on William Tecumseh Sherman - another general I've heard bits and pieces about, but am nevertheless excited to read even more about.

Six Frigates by Ian Toll

What an amazing book!  This book caught my eye while perusing Half Priced Books a while back and I've been itching to read it.

The six frigates the book refers to are the original ships of the line the United State built to form its Navy.

More than anything, this book seemed to be more steeped in history than strictly sticking to the frigates.  And this is so because these first battleships were closely intertwined with the politics of the Adams, Jefferson and Madison administrations.

I learned not only about the beginning of the Navy, but about world history in the period leading up to and including the War of 1812.  I was quite ignorant about this period of history.  Having read this book will also give me a stronger background for the Patrick O'Brian books.  In fact, Toll quoted a part of The Fortune of War which described the battle between Constitution and Java (both wikipedia entries have a section describing the battle between these two ships).

As a side note, when I decorated my office, I wanted a model ship on my shelf.  I ended up finding an old beat-up model at a garage sale.  It is a replica of the Constitution.  I never knew this battleship was so famous and amazing - again, this shows my ignorance and is therefore another reason I'm reading all these historical books.

Toll also provides an epilogue as well as some major events in the Navy and history of the six frigates leading up to 2005.  One of the nuggets he shared was Theodore Roosevelt's obsession with the Navy and some of his policies.  That might be another future book I'll be reading.

Overall, Six Frigates was exceptional.  It held my interest, was very informative and is well written.  It comes complete with an index and references.  Toll did history a tremendous favor with this book.

The Father of Us All by Victor Davis Hanson

I was very excited to read The Father of Us All.  As expected, it was fairly easy reading and extremely educational.  Hanson's ease of words makes it smooth for the reader.  His vast knowledge inspires the reader to learn more of military history.  I was very appreciative of the comprehensive list of books on war that he provided in the first chapter.  There is a lifetime of reading and learning in that list alone.

There were two main points that I got out of this book.  The first was the explanation of why we need to study war.  The old adage still holds true when it comes to war.  Those who do not know their history on war are doomed to repeat the same mistakes.  Hanson also laments the fact that Military History as a study has declined considerably.  He comments how few people know names and places of outcomes of battles.  One particular comment brought a stark realization to me - that I do not know much of past battles and sacrifices.  He said, "Military History has a moral purpose: educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security.  If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosin, the crosses in our military cemeteries are reduced to just pleasant white markers on lush green lawns."

The second point was about the pressures put on modern America to fight clean, flawless wars and how this has made it very difficult for America to "win" wars.  In her luxury, America wants quick victories with no losses.  Old School Americans scoff at this idea as they know that all wars are downright tragic and never perfect.  As Hanson repeats oft in the book, each warring side makes mistakes and therefore victory goes to the nation that learns from its mistakes more quickly than the other.

The rest of the book is commentary on these two points as well as the state of modern warfare.  One comment about modern warfare ... decisive warfare where the losing nation is outrightly defeated and humiliated is shunned upon in today's society.  Instead, the pervading notion is that we must simply put down the other nation without the humiliation.  It is a simple notion, but as I write this, I remember thinking as a kid that Germany, Italy and Japan were much better off losing outright to the Americans than if they had settled for peace.

Hanson also provides a lot of commentary on the current state of war in our world.  His insights to past and present wars rings a bell of warning to all those who would listen.  Sadly, however, many do not listen and instead choose to blindly believe that war can be outlawed or unlearned by people.  This dangerous line of thinking has not only been the demise of past nations but will prove to be the demise of current nations (especially those in the West) if they do not turn from this false reasoning.

Ripples of Battle by Victor Davis Hanson

Ripples of Battle is another one of those books by VDH that can be read again and again because there are so many gems in it.

In this book, he details the ripples of effects of three battles: Okinawa, Shiloh and Delium.

Okinawa


Kamikazes ("divine wind") were first seen on a large scale in October 1944.  Six months later, the Americans were beginning to invade Okinawa in preparation for invading the mainland of Japan.  In the battle of Okinawa, Kamikaze attacks continued on an even larger scale then when they had originally started six months previous.  "The Japanese were planning something on a scale entirely unforeseen in preparing some 4,000 planes for suicide attacks, commencing their sorties immediately after the initial landings [by the Americans]."  The large-scale Kamikaze attack is what prompted the unleashing of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Additionally, we continue to feel the reverberations of the Kamikaze attacks today in that our world will never be the same since 9/11.

"What those who crash airplanes in the past and present alike failed to grasp was also the nature of the deadly repercussions that arose from their explosions.  Suicide bombings strike at the very psyche of the Western mind that is repelled by the religious fanaticism and the authoritarianism, or perhaps the despair, of such enemies - confirming that wares are not just misunderstandings over policy of the reckless actions of a deranged leader, but accurate reflections of fundamental differences in culture and society.  In precisely the same way kamikazes off Okinawa led to A-bombs, so too jumbo jets exploding at the World Trade Center were the logical precursors to daisy-cutters, bunker-busters, and thermobaric bombs in Afghanistan - as an unleashed America resounded with a terrible fury not seen or anticipated since 1945.  The Western world publicly objected to the Israeli plunge into the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002 and it purported destruction of the civilian infrastructure - but much of it also privately sighed, "Such are the wages of suicide-murderers who blow up children in Tel Aviv."  If it is true that moral pretensions at restraint are the ultimate brakes on the murderous Western way of war, it is also accurate to suggest that such ethical restrictions erode considerably when the enemy employs suicide bombers." (p. 45-46)

The entire chapter is a fascinating read on kamikazes and the ripples of effects it had on America and our world today.  This chapter also had a personal effect on the author as the uncle he was named after was killed in the battle of Okinawa.  Reading of the effects this battle had on his life and his family's life is very fascinating and heart-wrenching.

Shiloh


I'm not a Civil War expert, but I have read a few books on Lincoln and the war itself.  But after reading this chapter, I was quite surprised at how many ripples Shiloh made on our culture.  I can't recall all the details, but I will try to note the ones that impressed me.

William Tecumseh Sherman was, for all intents and purposes, a nobody before the battle of Shiloh.  After the battle, he was a national icon and would go on to lead the Union to victory over the Confederacy.  In one battle, his and the nation's entire fate was changed.  In that same battle, he was wounded twice and had three horses shot out underneath him.  Had any one of those bullets strayed a few inches in another direction, those same fates would have been significantly different.

The whole concept of Lost Opportunity arose from this battle.  The South had virtually won the war, but with the death of General Johnston, the South did not pursue the North and the North was able to regroup and mount an counter attack.  From then on, the Southern culture has viewed the battle as the lost opportunity.

Brig General Lew Wallace's life was changed dramatically that same day and with it the culture of America.  His "lost" division, whether because of misunderstandings or lack of competence, caused controversies for years.  With this blunder, his military career was over.  The rest of his life was dedicated to seeking redemption.  In that process of seeking redemption he wrote Ben-Hur which would change American culture forever.  The book became a best-seller and then a stage production and then a big-screen movie several times.  It laid the foundation for books-to-movies for generations.

Lastly, Col. Nathan Bedford Forrest would become the thorn in the side for the Union for many years.  He not only survived Shiloh but became the icon of the South and would forever be associated with the Ku Klux Klan.

Delium


The Battle of Delium introduced to the world the unique idea of preemptive attacking for defensive purposes. The Athenians had essentially terrorized the Boeotians.  No battle broke out and both sides were about to return to normal life.  The Boeotian council debated and voted and were about to return home when one of its members spoke up.  "A single boeotarch resisted - the Theban Padondas, son of one Aoelidas, a gifted commander in his sixties and do doubt a veteran of the Theban triumph twenty-three years earlier at Coronea.  Through sheer force of personality and fiery speeches to the assembled rank and file, he convinced his colleagues to recommit the entire army and pursue the Athenians.  Quite remarkably they were won over and agreed immediately to break camp and march after the Athenians."  Delium ensued and the Athenians were routed and ripples were sent through Greek and even American military strategy.

The chapter also goes on to discuss the lives of Alcibiades, Socrates and other people who survived Delium and went on to have tremendous impacts to Western culture.

Overall, it was a really good read.  On a personal note - I started reading this book toward the end of April and beginning of May and as such, Memorial Day was on my mind.  The several passages the author used to discuss the uncle he never knew and his family's thoughts on this tragic loss brought tears to my eyes as I read them on the bus while going to work.  My heart swelled with tremendous gratitude for all those men and women who have served our country and died to defend her.  I don't have many regrets in life, but I do wonder occasionally how much different it would be had I acted on my youthful desires to join the military.

I only have the deepest respect for all those who sacrifice for our freedoms - from the 19-year old high school graduate serving in the Army to the 35-year old father of 4 who serves in Afghanistan who's wife reads reports on the Internet about a bombing near his base and can only sleeplessly worry if he is still alive or not for several hours before she finally gets an email from him.  God bless them all.

Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power by Victor Davis Hanson

What a tremendous book!  I read this book in the Fall of 2009.  I was so impressed and fascinated by this book I decided to read it again.  This is one of those books that should be required reading for every Western Civilization citizen from Europe to America.

As I've finished each chapter, I updated this post with quotes and thoughts I found interesting.

Never has a book taught me as much about my Western culture heritage as this book has.  The sampling of battles across time and space gave me an nice overview of Western civilization.  After reading this book, I wished I could take the History of Civilization courses at BYU again.  I also realized how little history I know and how interesting history can be.  There's still so many books to read with so little time ...

Salamis, September 28, 480 B.C.

The first battle discussed is Salamis.  The main point of this chapter was that free men fight better than enslaved men.  The Greek concept called eleutheria was why the Greeks defeated the Persians in this decisive battle.

Here are a few quotes I particularly liked:

"Greek moralists, in relating culture and ethics, had long equated Hellenic poverty with liberty and excellence, Eastern affluence with slavery and decadence.  So the poet Phycylides wrote, 'The law-biding polis, though small and set on a high rock, outranks senseless Ninevah'" (p. 33).

"When asked why the Greeks did not come to terms with Persia at the outset, the Spartan envoys tell Hydarnes, the military commander of the Western provinces, that the reason is freedom:  'Hydarnes, the advice you give us does not arise from a full knowledge of our situation.  You are knowledgeable about only one half of what is involved; the other half is blank to you.  The reason is that you understand well enough what slavery is, but freedom you have never experienced, so you do not know if it tastes sweet or not.  If you ever did come to experience it, you would advise us to fight for it not with spears only, but with axes too.'" (p. 47).

So the first element of why Western culture is so deadly is that we fight for freedom ... we fight for our families and our way of life.  I wonder if many of our citizens today realize what we have.  If we were to taste or experience anything less than the freedom we have, would we then be more willing to fight for it?  Sometimes I feel that too many take freedom for granted.

Guagamela, October 1, 331 B.C.

The second battle discussed is Guagamela fought by Alexander the Great.  What the Macedonians gave Western culture was shock battle.  Despite the perfect, prepped and flat terrain for his scythed chariots, Darius was not fully prepared for the full-on onslaught of Alexander's shock troops.

"Alexander won at Guagamela and elsewhere in Asia for the same reasons Greek infantry won overseas: theirs was a culture of face-to-face battle of rank-and-file columns, not a contest of mobility, numerical superiority, or ambush." (p. 70)

"Philip (Alexander's father) brought Western warefare an enhanced notion of decisive war ... The Macedonians saw no reason to stop fighting at the collapse of their enemy on the battlefield when he could be demolished in toto, and his house and land looted, destroyed, or annexed." (p. 77)

"Alexander brilliantly employed decisive battle in terrifying ways that its long-conquered Hellenic inventors had never imagined - and in a stroke of real genius he proclaimed that he had killed for the idea of brotherly love.  To Alexander the strategy of war meant not the defeat of the enemy, the return of the dead, the construction of a trophy, and the settlement of existing disputes, but, as his father had taught him, the annihilation of all combatants and the destruction of the culture itself that had dared to field such opposition to his imperial rule." (p. 83)

"I leave the reader with the dilemma of the modern age: the Western manner of fighting bequeathed to us from the Greeks and enhanced by Alexander is so destructive and so lethal that we have essentially reached an impasse.  Few non-Westerners wish to meet our armies in battle.  The only successful response to encountering a Western army seems to be to marshal another Western army.  The state of technology and escalation is such that any intra-Western conflict would have the opposite result of its original Hellenic intent: abject slaughter on both sides would result, rather than quick resolution.  Whereas the polis Greeks discovered shock battle as a glorious method of saving lives and confining conflict to an hour's worth of heroics between armored infantry, Alexander the Great and the Europeans who followed sought to unleash the entire power of their culture to destroy their enemies in a horrendous moment of shock battle.  That moment is now what haunts us" (p. 98)

Cannae, August 2, 216 B.C.

Hannibal Barca was brilliant, but the Roman way of war was truly resilient.  After it's second greatest defeat ever, Rome did not wallow in the mire of loss.  Rather it came back with avengence.  By 202 B.C. the Romans had turned the war around and had invaded Carthage.  The Battle of Zama brought the utter defeat of Carthage.  The reason Rome was able to turn defeat in Cannae into complete victory was due to their constitution and their nation-state, both of which enabled it to systematically raise, organize and deploy legions year after year, battle after battle and war after war.

"Hannibal's pleasure in his victory in the battle was not so great as his dejection, once he saw with amazement how steady and great-souled were the Romans in their deliberations." (Polybius, p. 111)

"The irony of the Second Punic War was that Hannibal, the sworn enemy of Rome, did much to make Rome's social and military foundations even stronger by incorporating the once 'outsider' into the Roman commonwealth.  By his invasion, he helped accelerate a second evolution in the history of Western republican government that would go well beyond the parochial constitutions of the Greek city-states.  The creation of a true nation-state would have military ramifications that would shake the entire Mediterranean world to its core - and help explain much of the frightening military dynamism of the West today." (p. 121)

"Under the late republic and empire to follow, freed slaves and non-Italian Mediterranean peoples would find themselves nearly as equal under the law as Roman blue bloods.

"This revolutionary idea of Western citizenship - replete with ever more rights and responsibilities - would provide superb manpower for the growing legions and a legal framework that would guarantee that the men who fought felt that they themselves in a formal and contractual sense had ratified the conditions of their own battle services.  The ancient Western world would soon come to define itself by culture rather than by race, skin color, or language." (p. 122)

"For although the Romans had clearly been defeated in the field, and their reputation in arms ruined, yet because of the singularity of their constitution, and by wisdom of their deliberative counsel, they not only reclaimed the sovereignty of Italy, and went on to conquer the Carthaginians, but in just a few years themselves became rulers of the entire world." (Polybius, p. 132)

Poitiers, October 11, 732

The Battle of Poitiers or Battle of Tours does not have a lot of accurate information on it.  There are so many differing sources as well as differing opinions on the battle, that it is hard to discern truth from speculation.  Hanson readily admits this, but it is all beside the point.  The important points are 1) Charles Martel led the European army with infantry (without horses) and 2) the Battle of Poitiers was key in the rise of Western European power.

There are several parts I highlighted in the book, but I am only going to mention one because I think it properly sums up the point of this chapter.

"Europe's renewed strength against the Other in the age of gunpowder was facilitated by the gold of the New World, the mass employment of firearms, and new designs of military architecture.  Yet the proper task of the historian is not simply to chart the course for this amazing upsurge in European influence, but to ask why the "Military Revolution" took place in Europe and not elsewhere.  The answer is that throughout the Dark and Middle Ages, European military traditions founded in classical antiquity were kept alive and improved upon in a variety of bloody wars against Islamic armies, Viking raiders, Mongols, and northern barbarian tribes.  The main components of the Western military tradition of freedom, decisive battle, civic militarism, rationalism, vibrant markets, discipline, disent, and free critique were not wiped out by the fall of Rome.  Instead they formed the basis of a succession of Merovingian, Carolingian, French, Dutch, Swiss, German, English, and Spanish militaries that continued the military tradition of classical antiquity.

"Key to this indefatigability was the ancient and medieval emphasis on foot soldiers, and especially the idea of free property owners, rather than slaves or serfs, serving as heavily armed infantrymen." (p. 168)

Tenochtitlán, June 24, 1520 - August 13, 1521

The title of this chapter is named "Technology and the Wages of Reason."  It is so named because he argues that Western culture cultivated an environment of scientific research which was responsible for why a small group of conquistadors destroyed an entire civilization.

I have to admit that this chapter was the most fascinating of all the chapters in this book.  After reading about La Noche Triste and how Cortés barely escaped the Aztec capitol and then in less than a year how he and his men annihilated the Aztecs, I was truly in awe.  Taking all morality about the conquistadors out of the equation, Cortés' comeback has to be one of the all-time best comebacks.  And he was able to make that comeback because of the culture in which he was raised and lived.

"Under the tenets of European wars of annihilation, letting a man like Cortés - or an Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Richard the Lion-Hearted, Napolean, or Lord Chelmsford - escape with his army after defeat was no victory, but only an assurance that the next round would be bloodier still, when an angrier, more experienced, and wiser force would return to settle the issue once and for all." (p. 181)

"In the case of all discoveries, the results of previous labors that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on." (Aristotle p. 231)

"Western technological superiority is not merely a result of the military renaissance of the sixteenth century or an accident of history, much less the result of natural resources, but predicated on an age-old method of investigation, a peculiar mentality that dates back to the Greeks and not earlier." (p. 231)

"Cortés, like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Don Juan of Austria, and other Western captains, often annihilated without mercy their numerically superior foes, not because their own soldiers were necessarily better in war, but because their traditions of free inquiry, rationalism, and science most surely were." (p. 232)

Lepanto, Ocotber 7, 1571

The purpose of this chapter ("The Market-or Capitalism Kills") is to offer evidence of how Western technology and capitalism defeat non-Western culture.  Throughout history, non-Western cultures sought out Westerners for technology because non-Western cultures never developed a natural inquiry into science and capitalism.

At Lepanto, it was the free market which allowed the money to be raised to invest in quality and powerful ships which, in the first few minutes of the battle, decimated many of the Turkish ships.

"In Europe the social ramifications of military technology were far less important that its simple efficacy; the sultan, however, was careful that weapons in and of themselves - like printing presses - should not prove to be sources of social and cultural unrest." (p. 248)

Regarding the aftermath of the battle, "there was to be little exegesis and analysis concerning the shortcomings in the sultan's equipment, command, and naval organization.

"In contrast, dozens of highly emotive firsthand narratives in Italian and Spanish - often at odds with each other in a factual and analytical sense - spread throughout the Mediterranean." (p. 251)

"Before the fleet had even sailed, papal ministers had calculated the entire cost of manning two hundred galleys, with crews and provisions, for a year - and had raised the necessary funds in advance." (p. 258)

"The sultan sought out European traders, ship designers, seamen, and imported firearms - even portrait painters - while almost no Turks found their services required in Europe." (p. 262)

And lastly, on a more contemporary note, I found this quote quite appropriate for these times in 2010: "In the twilight of the empire, observers were quick to point out that Roman military impotence was a result of a debased currency, exorbitant taxation, and the manipulation of the market by inefficient government price controls, corrupt governmental traders, and unchecked tax farmers - the wonderful system of raising capital operating in reverse as it devoured savings and emptied the countryside of once-productive yeomen." (p. 275)

Rorke's Drift, January 22-23, 1879

The main point of this chapter was to demonstrate discipline - the ability to do as commanded in order to fight as one group - to defend the group instead of seeking glory for the individual warrior.

There are two quotes that sum up this chapter quite well.

"The Europeans were willing to fight 365 days a year, day or night, regardless of the exigencies of either their Christian faith or the natural year.  Bad weather, disease, and difficult geography were seen as simple obstacles to be conquered by the appropriate technology, military discipline, and capital, rarely as expressions of divine ill will or the hostility of all-powerful spirits.  Europeans often looked at temporary setbacks differently from their adversaries in Asia, America, or Africa.  Defeat signaled no angry god or adverse fate, but rather a rational flaw in either tactics, logistics, or technology, one to be easily remedied on the next occasion - through careful audit and analysis.  The British in Zululand, like all Western armies, and as Clausewitz saw, did envision battle as a continuation of politics by other means.  Unlike the Zulus, the British army did not see war largely as an occasion for individual warriors to garner booty, women, or prestige." (p. 309)

"We hear through Greek literature of the necessity of staying in rank, of rote and discipline as more important than mere strength and bravado.  Men carry their shields, Plutarch wrote, 'for the sake of the entire line' (Moralis 220A).  Real strength and bravery were for carrying a shield in formation, not for killing dozens of the enmy in iindividual combat, which was properly the stuff of epic and mythology.  Xenophon remind us that from freeholding property owners comes such group cohesion and discipline: 'In fighting, just as in working the soil, it is necessary to have the help of other people.' (Oeconomicus 5.14)  Punishments were given only to those who threw down their shields, broke rank, or caused panic, never to those who failed to kill enough of the enemy." (p. 326)

"In the long annals of military history, it is difficult to find anything quite like Rorke's Drift, where a beleaguered force, outnumbered forty to one, survived and killed twenty men for every defender lost.  But then it is also rare to find warriors as well trained as European soldiers, and rarer still to find any Europeans as disciplined as the British redcoats of the late nineteenth century." (p. 333)

Battle of Midway, June 4-8, 1942

The Battle of Midway is used to demonstrate Western individualism.  Hanson cites four critical ways the Americans demonstrated Western individualism and thus won this key battle.

1) "the breaking of the Japanese naval codes"
2) "the repair of the carrier Yorktown"
3) "the nature of the U.S. naval command"
4) "the behavior of American pilots" (p. 370)

He also notes that Japan, although militarily "Westernized" did not change culturally in conjunction with their military revolution and thus caused failures in their defeat at Miday.

Here are a few quotes I had noted from the book.

"Yet the Japanese wide-scale adoption of Western technology was also not always what it seemed at first glance.  There remained stubborn Japanese cultural traditions that would resurface to hamper a truly unblinkered Western approach to scientific research and weapons development.  The Japanese had always entertained an ambiguous attitude about their own breakneck efforts at Westernization." (p. 359)

"The Japanese were not comfortable with the rather different Western notion of seeking out the enemy without deception, to engage in bitter shock collision, one whose deadliness would prove decisive for the side with the greater firepower, discipline, and numbers." (p. 363)

"Although slow to anger, Western constitutional governments usually preferred wars of annihilation ... all part of a cultural tradition to end hostilities quickly, decisively, and utterly." (p. 364-5)

"In the final analysis, the root cause of Japan's defeat, not alone in the Battle of Midway but in the entire war, lies deep in the Japanese national character.  There is an irrationality and impulsiveness about our people which results in actions that are haphazard and often contradictory.  A tradition of provincialism makes us narrow-minded and dogmatic, reluctant to discard prejudices and slow to adopt even necessary improvements if they require a new concept.  Indecisive and vacillating, we succomb readily to conceit, which in turn makes us disdainful of others.  Opportunistic but lacking in a spirit of daring and independance, we are wont to place reliance on others and to truckle to superiors." (M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya, Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan, 247). (p. 370)

Tet, January 31-April 6, 1968

Reading this chapter, like the rest of the book, was quite enlightening.  This chapter did much to explain not only this key battle in the Vietnam War, but also why and how that war was fought.  All I've known of this war is from watching Hollywood movies.  So reading this chapter has really opened my eyes.

Like the chapter on Cortes and the Aztecs, in which I learned some heavy statistics about the gory and bloody habits of the Aztecs, I learned about the brutality of the North Vietnamese.  It seems that when it comes to Conquistadores and the US military in Vietnam, all we hear about are the brutalities of Cortes and the Marines.  But when compared to the Aztecs and North Vietnamese, these sins seem to pale in comparison.  The Western media was quick to point out Western mistakes and atrocities, but mute on the utter evil the Communists committed.  The reasons behind this imbalanced view are complex, but the fact that this dissention even exists is wholly attributable to Western culture.

There are two passages that stood out to me.  The first essentially discusses what went wrong in the war.  The second sums up the role of dissent and self-critique, which was always on display, in the Viet Nam war.

"How odd that at the pinnacle of a lethal 2,500-year-old military tradition, American planners completely ignored the tenets of the entire Western military heritage.  Cortes - also outnumbered, far from home, in a strange climate, faced with near insurrection among his own troops and threats of recall from home, fighting a fanatical enemy that gave no quarter, with fickle allies - at least knew that his own soldiers and the Spanish crown cared little how many actual bodies of the enemy he might count, but a great deal whether he took and held Tenochtitlan and so ended resistance with his army largely alive.  Lord Chelmsford - likewise surrounded by criticism in and out of the army, under threat of dismissal, ignorant of the exact size, nature, and location of his enemy, suspicious of Boer colonialists, English idealists, and tribal allies - at least realized that until he overran Zululand, destroyed the nucleus of the royal kraals, and captured the king, the war would go on despite the thousands of Zulus who fell to his deadly Martini-Hentry rifles.

"American generals never fully grasped, or never successfully transmitted to the political leadership in Washington, that simple lesson: that the number of enemy killed meant little in and of itself if the land of South Vietnam was not secured and held and the antagonist North Vietnam not invaded, humiliated, or rendered impotent.  Few, if any, of the top American brass resigned out of principle over the disastrous rules of engagement that ensured their brave soldiers would be killed without a real chance of decisive military victory.  It was as if thousands of graduates from American's top military academies had not a clue about their own lethal heritage of the Western way of war." (p. 407)

"This strange propensity for self-critique, civilian audit, and popular criticism of military operations - itself part of the larger Western tradition of personal freedom, consensual government, and individualism - thus poses a paradox.  The encouragement of open assessment and the acknowledgment of error within the military eventually bring forth superior planning and a more flexible response to adversity.

"At the same time, this freedom to distort can often hamper military operations of the moment." (p. 438)

Summary

I'm afraid I'm a victim to how Western media has continually criminalized the West for its wars and brutalities.  There are two sides to every story.  It seems as though all we hear is the one-sided, constant put-down by those who want to see the West destroyed.  The way I see it is that if it were not for the West and its culture, the world would be a much more brutal place with much more death and destruction and injustice.  Death and destruction and injustice will always exist among our imperfect human race.  But that does not mean we simply let tyrants rule us or that we impugn those who seek to destroy tyranny.  The West has consistently provided a culture which allows freedom to exist and flourish.  Without that culture (and the military tradition to go with it), the world would indeed be ruled by tyrants and millions more would be slaves rather than free men.