Phil 415 - Stoic Threads in Hobbesian Philosophy

 Stoic Threads in Hobbesian Philosophy

On November 28, 2022, the world’s largest active volcano erupted for the first time in almost 40 years (Derrick). As the world witnessed the hot, fiery lava spew out and flow down the mountain, it was reminded, albeit on a small scale, that the universe loves to change and be in constant motion. One can’t help but observe in awe the hot lava settling and pondering how long it will take for the first biological life to emerge once the lava cools, decomposes and becomes the rich soil in which life will grow. While this fiery substance proves to be a key ingredient for life, the Stoics and Hobbes theorized on another substance which is the cause in all motion in the universe, including human passions: the substance of God.

Hobbes’s ideas on the materialism of God and the passions have their roots in Stoicism. While the Stoics viewed pneuma as the essence of God and motion in all bodies, Hobbes conceived God as “subtle fluid or spirit” (Gorham, 38). As God is the source of existence, things remain in motion by self-perpetuation. Both Hobbes and the Stoics claim oikeiosis, or self-preservation as the prime mover of people and that it is inherent in all living things. Yet, if this impulse for self-preservation is left unchecked by reason, it leads to unbridled passions (Santi, 67). As to how reason should be applied to rein in passions, Hobbes’s and the Stoics’ views part ways and diverge widely. Whereas the Stoics would teach the individual to be rational and to perhaps stamp out passions, Hobbes sees passions playing a pivotal role prior to the formation of the State and then having the absolute ruler manage people’s passions via an “enlightened sovereign” (71). One might say the Stoics prefer a bottom-up approach to dealing with passions while Hobbes would be a top-down approach (i.e., the Leviathan). Regardless of which paradigm for passion management is used, all lives begin with motion. Hobbes’s own inception of motion begins with fear. 

The Spanish Armada appeared over the horizon off the English coast – war! Close to 130 ships attacked England between July 31 and August 4, 1588 (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica). The sight of the armada must have instilled fear in many as it was “an awesome spectacle to behold … [each ship] with lofty turrets like castles” (Hanson). Leading up to the clash, the people of England were in the grips of terror, including Thomas Hobbes’s mother.  Hobbes wrote, “rumor went everywhere through our towns that the last day for the nation was coming by fleet. And at that point, my mother was filled with such fear that she bore twins, me and together with me fear” (Martinich, 2). Hobbes and his “twin” were born April 5, 1588 – close to 4 months before the armada was to be seen off the coast of Plymouth. Hobbes would smartly observe of his birth, that the harrowing circumstances would affect him throughout life and would explain his “hatred for the enemies of [his] country” (2). The cause of the Spanish armada sailing to England is a complicated web of multiple causes and effects and lots of motion, both actual and political.

As with many philosophers of his day, Hobbes would have been familiar with multiple ancient and contemporary theories as to the ultimate cause of all motion. Most of these theories go on to attribute some force - calling it God - as the source cause of all motion. Among the many philosophies with which Hobbes was familiar was that of the Stoics and their theories on metaphysics. The Stoics noted both active and passive elements in the universe. The active was associated with the “rational principle (logos)” and they called this “God and Mind and Fate and Zeus” (Gorham, 37). More specifically, the Stoics called the essence of the substance of God pneuma and they likened it to “sperm or seed which contains the first principles or directions of all the things” (Baltzly). Hobbes, who would have encountered many Stoic ideas via his time tutoring and working with the Cavendishes, conceived the essence of God “as an infinitely subtle fluid or ‘spirit’ … [which is] ‘thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body” (Gorham, 38-39, 44). To remove all doubt as to his possible source of his ideas of the essence of God, he also wrote that his definition of “spirit” means “breadth, air, wind” in Latin and pneuma in Greek (39). If Hobbes’s spirit of God and the Stoics’ pneuma are the primal cause of existence, what is the next chain in the grand causal effect? Both Hobbes and the Stoics align on “the doctrine of oikeiosis … the principle of self-preservation” as the explanation of the cosmos’s perpetual motion (Santi, 67).

 In his article, Psychology and Politics: Hobbes, Chrysippus the Stoic and the Passions, Santi quotes Diogenes Laertius, who wrote that a “living being has, as first impulse, that of conserving itself … [pushing] away what is harmful … and [getting] near to what is proper as well as familiar” (67). In the same article, he quotes Hobbes: “necessity of nature makes men to will and desire bonum sibi, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful” (67). This impulse to survive is the cause of many actions and movements in the universe, which sustain life and cause change. Is it any wonder, then, when an individual, or a family face dire circumstance, or even perceived threats to their survival, that they begin to take action to ensure their existence? This type of thinking is precisely at the root of the cause and effect of the English Civil War.

As with the invasion of the Spanish Armada, the causes of the English Civil war were complex and tangled. But the fundamental cause of grievances between the English monarchy and the English parliament was about money and the viability of citizens’ existence. While the monarchy wanted to raise funds to support its lifestyle or even start a “war against Scotland,” the “majority of members” of parliament wanted to address and manage their “grievances about ship money, forced loans, coat and conduct money” – things which they had been complaining about for more than a decade (Martinich, 122). Even though Hobbes’s livelihood would not be greatly impacted by demands from the king, he had written things in “defense of absolute sovereignty” and he had seen other people, who were in favor of an “absolute monarch,” be charged and arrested by Parliament (161). When Hobbes witnessed “the king’s chief ministers” as well as “the king’s chief counselor and the highest-ranking clergymen” being charged and arrested, he knew “Parliament wasn’t [acting] logical” and in a matter of days, he made arrangements to flee to France and then left in such a hurry, “he did not even wait for his luggage to be packed” (161-162).

While historians may debate as to whether Parliament, the monarchy or even Hobbes were acting logically or not, it does not take much imagination to see how an impulse to survive can be taken to an extreme. Returning to Santi, he makes the connection between the impulse for self-preservation and passion. Quoting Chrysippus the Stoic, he writes, “an impulse can also be rational, following right reason, but in the majority of people it is irrational and ‘contrary to nature’: it is ‘an excessive impulse’ that originates the passions” (68). Similarly, Hobbes agrees that passions are based on “memories of the past” or “expectations of the future” and that these passions “originate, in the mind” (68). Alas, this is where Hobbes and the Stoics cease in agreement, and subsequently depart into different directions regarding the management of passions.

Without getting into the full explanation of the Stoic theory of passions, the Stoics believe that passion is something the sage would never experience, since the Stoic sage would not have any “false beliefs about what is good and bad” (Brennan, 38). In other words, a practicing Stoic would not hold the belief that desire for money, or the fear of pain is either good or bad. If applied to Hobbes when he faced the threat of arrest from Parliament, instead of fleeing to France, perhaps he would have remained to perform his duties in England.

While the Stoics would recommend the individual work to hold correct beliefs about the world and to rationally control passions, Hobbes views passions as a force to be joined with reason in a “positive alliance” (Santi, 69). The key aspect of his idea is the “contrast between what drives conflict and what allows cooperative endeavor, rather than any quasi-Stoic view about how reason can overcome the passions” (Schmitter). Hobbes writes that “competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclines to contention, enmity, and war” but he also holds that “desire of ease, and sensual delight” along with the desires for learning and a “love of the arts” and fame, cause “men to obey a common power” (Santi, 69). He sees passion as the driving force both leading up to the creation and the sustaining of the State. For him, the telos of humankind is to live in a state of obedience to an ultimate sovereign who would preserve their security and ensure their passions are satisfied rationally (69-70). In fact, in his Leviathan, he “hopes that his theoretic principles will be embraced by an enlightened sovereign” who also is “the only legitimate moral philosopher … be it a king or an assembly” (71). If any additional nails are needed to close the coffin on an endorsement of a personal philosophy, as opposed to a State philsophy, Santi notes that Hobbes thought the “ancient philosophers were wrong and presumptuous in proposing their personal philosophic view as the true way of living” (71). For Hobbes, “the laws of the commonwealth … are the ground and measure of all true morality” (71).

In his masterpiece, Leviathan, in the first part of On Man, he gloomily described the human life as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 102). But as one reflects on Hobbes’s life, one comes to find the countless people with whom he worked – he was never alone.  One learns he was well compensated and connected to powerful people – he was never poor.  One further learns that his life was most assuredly not short – he died at age 91 on December 4, 1679. But as for life being brutish, perhaps he was correct. Because of the perpetual motion of unreasonable passions, he felt the effects of foreign powers at home and abroad, he witnessed a civil war in his homeland and “lived in a time of upheaval, sharper than any England has since known” - in a time of great division amongst the government, religions, militaries and economies (Williams). Given this “brutish” context, it is no wonder Hobbes advocated for a Leviathan to rule over people who could not rule themselves.

In conclusion, a few key threads in Hobbes’s philosophy can be traced back to Stoicism – namely his ideas on God and human passions. The Stoics and Hobbes identified fine, pervasive substance as the essence of God. This essence, in turn is the catalyst for self-preservation, which they both indicate as the prime mover of people and that it is inherent in all living things. Both agree that unchecked self-preservation can lead to passions. However, Hobbes and the Stoics part ways as to how the passions ought to be managed. The Stoics advocate for individuals to be rational and to perhaps eradicate passions, but Hobbes sees passions performing a crucial role prior to the formation of the State. The State then rules over her subjects and manages people’s passions via an “enlightened sovereign” (Santi, 71).  In sum, the individual lives for the State, and the State is “the ground and measure of all true morality” (71). 

Works Cited

Baltzly, Dirk. “Stoicism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019, plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#Phys.

Brennan, Tad. The Stoic Life : Emotions, Duties, and Fate. Oxford Oxford University Press, 2005.

Derrick, Bryson T., and Oliver Whang. Mauna Loa Volcano in Hawaii Erupts for the First Time in Nearly 40 Years. ProQuest, Nov 28, 2022, http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fblogs-podcasts-websites%2Fmauna-loa-volcano-hawaii-erupts-first-time-nearly%2Fdocview%2F2740490390%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D8289.

Gorham, Geoffrey. "Mixing Bodily Fluids: Hobbes's Stoic God." Sophia, vol. 53, no. 1, 2014, pp. 33-49. ProQuest, http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarly-journals%2Fmixing-bodily-fluids-hobbess-stoic-god%2Fdocview%2F1524330134%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D8289, doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0377-x.

Hanson, Neil. The Confident Hope of a Miracle. Vintage, 2007.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, edited by Karl Schuhmann, and G. A. J. Rogers, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1749471.

Martinich, A. P. Hobbes : A Biography. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Santi, Raffaella. "PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS: HOBBES, CHRYSIPPUS THE STOIC AND THE PASSIONS." Agathos, vol. 8, no. 2, 2017, pp. 57-73. ProQuest, http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarly-journals%2Fpsychology-politics-hobbes-chrysippus-stoic%2Fdocview%2F1965027693%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D8289.

Schmitter, Amy M. “17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions > Hobbes on the Emotions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Plato.stanford.edu, 2021, plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html.

The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Spanish Armada | Definition, Defeat, & Facts.” Encyclopædia Britannica, 14 June 2017, www.britannica.com/topic/Armada-Spanish-naval-fleet.

Williams, Garrath. “Hobbes, Thomas: Moral and Political Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/.

Phil 302 Four Epictetian Analogies Explaining Stoicism

Four Epictetian Analogies Explaining Stoicism

Born in 55, Epictetus was enslaved early in his life or even from birth, as he was taken to Rome “as a boy” by Epaphroditus (Seddon).  As a slave, he was introduced to and studied Stoicism with Musonius Rufus, who some modern scholars call “the Roman Socrates” (Gaius Musonius Rufus and Lutz, 4). Prior to 89, he was freed and then sometime between 89 and 95 he was part of the group of philosophers who were expelled from Rome by the emperor Domitian (Long, 9).  From Rome, he fled to Nicopolis where he founded his philsophy school and taught there for the remainder of his life (Seddon).  Epictetus’ student Arrian wrote much of what survives of his teachings today.  Arrian wrote them “as a literal record of Epictetus’ teachings, based on the notes he took as a student” (Epictetus, et al., ivvv).  If nothing else could be said of Epictetus, the one idea he relentlessly taught was to live Stoicism.  In the Handbook, he emphasizes that the only pride one ought to have is not for the ability to read and understand the teachings, but to apply them (Handbook 49).  Because of his impact on his students, he earned a legendary reputation and was more popular in his day than Plato was in his (Seddon).

Stoicism is learned and lived in three parts: logic, physics, and ethics.  All three work together to explain the whole philosophy.  Early founders of Stoicism used analogies to explain the three topics.  One analogy is that of an egg where the shell represents logic, the egg white represents ethics, and the yolk represents physics.  Two other analogies compared philosophy to the body (bones and sinews as logic, flesh as ethics, and the soul as physics), and a fruit field (wall as logic, fruit as ethics, land, and trees as physics) (Long and Sedley, 158).  The point of these analogies was to show that all three are necessary and one could not truly understand or live Stoicism with only one or two topics.

In similar fashion, Epictetus used analogies to teach his students how to learn and apply various aspects of Stoicism.  This essay will focus on four examples, which provide a rough explanation of the philosophy.  The first will focus on logic as a standard for knowledge and the analogy of knowing what a measurement is and how to use tools to measure.  The second and third will focus on physics and how one can live in agreement with Nature or God, as well as living in agreement with one’s individual nature by using the analogies of visiting one of the seven wonders of the world as well as being a vivid thread.  And lastly, the fourth analogy will focus on how ethics ought to be lived and not merely discussed, by using an analogy of a carpenter who truly builds something rather than merely discussing it.

Logic and the use of senses help one learn how the world works and really is, which help an individual to use his volition to make the best choice.  Epictetus compares logic with understanding how to measure or weigh something.  If an individual’s goal is to build or bake something, then that person must have a sound understanding of the concepts of measuring and weighing, as well as how to use the tools to accomplish good measurement and weighing.  If one does not know what measurement or weight is, or what a ruler or scale does, then how could he begin to build or make something?  In Discourses 1.17.7, he teaches, “unless we start off by establishing what a unit of measurement is, and what a balance is, how shall we ever be able to weigh or measure anything?”  Applied to philsophy, one must know the standard of knowledge and how to use the tool humans have been given (their mind) to demonstrate sound judgement and volition.  Equipped with standards and the correct use of his mind, the individual begins to distinguish the things which up to him and which are not.  From this knowledge, the person begins to comprehend how he is a minuscule part of the Whole and begins to gain an appreciation for the spectacle of the Cosmos, or the Stoic god.

Because much of the world and Cosmos is “not up to us” the individual ought to assume the wise attitude of following and seeking to understand Nature as opposed to seeking to control it or complain about it (Handbook 1).  Part of living this wise attitude is to appreciate Nature rather than wasting time complaining about it.  In another analogy Epictetus compares one’s attitude to that of visiting a sculpture of Phidias, who sculpted one of the seven wonders of the world (Jordan, 77).  While many people would endure heat, crowds, rains, shouting and “other irritations” just for the chance to see the work of Phidias, when it comes to appreciate the works of Nature directly in front of them, they have no desire to comprehend them, but would rather complain about the trials and hardships of life (Discourses 1.6.23-28).  Therefore, just as people endured all types of hardships for the chance to see one of the seven wonders of the world, so too should they endure much to learn, appreciate, and live according to Nature.  And not only are people to follow Nature, but they are to align their individual wills or their inner daimon with the greater Cosmos (Bonhöffer and Stephens, 13)

Part of aligning one’s will with Nature is to determine who one really is and stand out by performing his own unique part in life.  In the third analogy, Epictetus teaches that one ought to learn his unique role and then be the distinctive thread in a cloth.  One should say to himself, “I want to be the purple, the small gleaming band that makes all the rest appear splendid and beautiful” (Discourses 1.2.18).  Epictetus similarly teaches one should learn his unique talents and not ignore them (Handbook 37).  Lastly, one learns that he may have an assigned role which he is to play and rather than complaining about what parts he does not get to play, he ought to learn his part and play it well (Handbook 17).  The unifying concept in many of these analogies is action.

Philosophy is to be lived, not merely studied.  If one were only to study philosophy, but not live it, he is no better than a person who expounds about the process of building, but never actually builds something.  “A builder doesn’t come forward and say, ‘Listen to me as I deliver a discourse about the builder’s art,’ but he acquires a contract to build a house and shows through actually building it that he has mastered the art” (Discourses 3.21.4).    In the same passage, Epictetus continues by enumerating many duties a Stoic ought to perform in order to live an ethical life, including how to eat, drink, take care of oneself, rear a family, participate as a citizen, endure insults, and tolerate family and neighbors when they behave badly.  All duties relate back to the core virtues.  The best practiced volition is one that demonstrates justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom regardless of circumstances (Hadot, 233).

While this essay only focused on four analogies, Epictetus’ wide and varied use of parallels can be seen throughout all his works.  This essay focused on a subset of comparisons, which guide the reader in a general direction of how Stoicism can be explained and lived.  Epictetus used measuring to demonstrate how one ought to be familiar with logic, concepts, and tools.  He compared visiting one of the wonders of the world, as well as a vibrant thread for how one ought to view life in general.  And lastly, he compared living one’s philosophy to a carpenter who truly builds something rather than merely talking about it.  When the student actually sees the wonders of life, or a vibrant thread, or a measuring ruler or a carpenter, then perhaps he will be more likely to remember Epictetus’ teachings and strive to live them.

Works Cited

Bonhöffer, Adolf Friedrich, and William O. Stephens. The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus : An English Translation. Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, 2021.Epictetus, et al. Discourses, Fragments, Handbook. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Epictetus, et al. Discourses, Fragments, Handbook. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Gaius Musonius Rufus, and Cora E. Lutz. Musonius Rufus - “the Roman Socrates.” Yale Univ. Press, 1947.

Hadot, Pierre, and Michael Chase. The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Cambridge, Mass. London Harvard University Press, 2001.

Long, A. A. Epictetus : A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Clarendon Press, 2013.

Long, A. A., and David N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers Commentary. Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Jordan, Paul. Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, Taylor & Francis Group, 2002. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/apus/detail.action?docID=1683541.

Seddon, Keith H. “Epictetus | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3 Jan. 2003, iep.utm.edu/epictetu/.

Letters from a Stoic 106 - On the Corporeality of Virtue

On the Corporeality of Virtue

This is an 'academic' type letter in which Seneca outlines the argument that virtue is a body or corporeal.  There is nothing new or significant, in my opinion, about this letter.  For those interested (who are reading this letter), I would direct you to a couple of links.

See my summary of John Sellars chapter on Stoic Physics.  It discusses this at a good level as to what the argument was and why the Stoics took the position they did.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the entry on Stoic Physics is good too.

One other thing I will note from this letter - his introduction.  He writes,

My tardiness in answering your letter was not due to press of business. Do not listen to that sort of excuse; I am at liberty, and so is anyone else who wishes to be at liberty. No man is at the mercy of affairs. He gets entangled in them of his own accord, and then flatters himself that being busy is a proof of happiness.

This is an important observation he makes.  How often do we make excuses for things; and blame the excuse on something beyond our control, when in fact, it was up to us?  Indeed, blame 'busyness' for why you did not do something, but you were still 'at liberty' to stop the busyness and do whatever might be more important.

It may seem like a minor quibble, but it's worth a self-reflection.  Our choices make us who we are.  The tangled web of events are complicated, but be sure to not entangle what is 'up to you' in things that are 'not up to you.'  Take responsibility for what is 'up to you' and be precise when casting blame to a certain cause.

Letters from a Stoic 89 - On the Parts of Philosophy

On the Parts of Philosophy

Studying the parts of philosophy help to comprehend the whole.  But in so doing, be mindful not to break it down into too many parts as well as trying to bite off more than you can comprehend.

Modern Stoicism is mainly studied with three break-downs: physics, logic and ethics.  In this letter, Seneca references the three divisions as moral, natural, and rational.  I can't help but see

• moral related to ethics 
• natural related to physics
• rational related to logic

I'll get into these a bit more, but let's jump back to the beginning of the letter.

Why study philosophy in parts?

studying the parts we can be brought more easily to understand the whole.

However, we must not divide it too much.

useful that philosophy should be divided, but not chopped into bits. ... the parts, as I have remarked, must not be countless in number and diminutive in size. For over-analysis is faulty in precisely the same way as no analysis at all.

Is there a difference between wisdom and philosophy?  Wisdom is the aim; philosophy is the process.

Wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind; philosophy is the love of wisdom, and the endeavour to attain it. ... Philosophy does the going, and wisdom is the goal.

The two cannot be separated.

Certain of our school, however, although philosophy meant to them "the study of virtue," and though virtue was the object sought and philosophy the seeker, have maintained nevertheless that the two cannot be sundered. ... the path by which one reaches virtue leads by way of virtue herself; philosophy and virtue cling closely together.

He then briefly elaborates on the various divisions of philosophy and what their study entails.

Moral

He states that the moral division is further divided into three parts.  As I read his notes on this, it does seem that the moral division deals with proper duties and actions.

First, we have the speculative part, which assigns to each thing its particular function and weighs the worth of each; it is highest in point of utility. For what is so indispensable as giving to everything its proper value? The second has to do with impulse, the third with actions.  For the first duty is to determine severally what things are worth; the second, to conceive with regard to them a regulated and ordered impulse; the third, to make your impulse and your actions harmonize, so that under all these conditions you may be consistent with yourself.

Natural

The natural division is also further divided and indeed seems roughly correlated to the study of [meta]physics.  The two main divisions of the natural division are,

bodily and non-bodily.  Each is divided into its own grades of importance, so to speak. The topic concerning bodies deals, first, with these two grades: the creative and the created; and the created things are the elements. Now this very topic of the elements, as some writers hold, is integral; as others hold, it is divided into matter, the cause which moves all things, and the elements.

Rational

The last division deals with learning and logic and mostly aligns with reading and writing.

Now all speech is either continuous, or split up between questioner and answerer. It has been agreed upon that the former should be called rhetoric, and the latter dialectic. Rhetoric deals with words, and meanings, and arrangement. Dialectic is divided into two parts: words and their meanings, that is, into things which are said, and the words in which they are said. Then comes a subdivision of each – and it is of vast extent.

He concludes the letter to Lucilius, with an exhortation that no matter how he studies philosophy, he puts what he learns into practice.

promptly relate to conduct all that you have read.  It is your conduct that you must hold in check; you must rouse what is languid in you, bind fast what has become relaxed, conquer what is obstinate, persecute your appetites, and the appetites of mankind, as much as you can; and to those who say: "How long will this unending talk go on?" answer with the words: "I ought to be asking you 'How long will these unending sins of yours go on?'"

Seneca then goes on to ask prompting questions with the intent of laying down vices and passions.  He lambasts greed in owning land, many and spacious villas and estates, embracing luxury, as well as having insatiable appetites.  Here are a couple which stood out to me.

What profit to you are your many bed-chambers? You sleep in one. No place is yours where you yourselves are not.

...

How slight a portion of all those shell-fish, imported from so far, slips down that insatiable gullet? Poor wretches, do you not know that your appetites are bigger than your bellies?

Regardless of how you study philosophy, direct your learning back to wise living.

everything you hear or read, is to be applied to conduct, and to the alleviation of passion's fury. Study, not in order to add anything to your knowledge, but to make your knowledge better.

Notes on Stoic Physics from Stoicism by John Sellars

Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being and deals with all questions about the physical world.  The fundamental ontological assertion of the Stoics “underpinning all of Stoic physics is the claim that only bodies exist” (p. 81, Sellars).

The Platonic position was a “claim that the material world that we experience is merely a shadow of another realm where real existence lies” (p. 81, Sellars).

Plato was attacking all hard-lined, as well as moderate materialist perspectives.  He wished for any and all materialists “to admit to the existence of something that is not a body” (p. 82, Sellars).

Stoics believe that for something to exist it must have a body.

To avoid the Platonic trap, Zeno claimed that certain intangible things like soul, justice, virtue, and wisdom actually do exist and are bodies.  He grants Plato’s assumption that only bodies can act and be acted upon (p. 82, Sellars).  But as was discussed in the chapter on Logic in Sellars’ book, propositions (cognitions, impressions we assent to) are physical entities and so therefore intangibles such as virtue, justice or wisdom would be considered bodies.

Incorporeals subsist.  The four types of incorporeals are: void, time, place and sayables (p. 83, Sellars).

The present moment “belongs.”  This means the past and the future are non-existent realities and therefore subsist.  But the present is more real than the future or past, but still “is not as real as a physical object” and therefore “belongs” (p. 84, Sellars).

Universals of Platonic ideas, according to the Stoics “neither exist nor subsist” and “such entities are dismissed as ‘not-somethings’” … but by labeling these as “not-somethings” it creates another “category within the Stoic ontological scheme” therefore they “explicitly reject universals conceived as Platonic ideas” (p. 84, Sellars).

The ‘Stoic trap’ that Chrysippus devises goes like this:

If someone is in Athens, he is not in Magara;
“man” is in Athens;
Therefore, “man” is not in Magara.

The point Stoics want to make is “to deny that the generic name ‘man’ refers to anything at all.”  Platonists would insist that “man” is someone or something, yet the argument shows it cannot be someone or something.  The Platonist would agree with the first two premises, but if he agrees with the conclusion, he will agree with the Stoics that “man” is not-something, while if he rejects the conclusion, he must reject that “man” is someone or something – which he won’t want to admit.

The two material principals are:
a) “that which acts (to poioun) and
b) “that which is acted upon (to paschon) or we might say the active and the passive; they are God and matter” (p. 86, Sellars)

“Ancient sources” and “modern commentators suggest that the Stoics proposed a strict monism, that is, a conception of a single unified material reality.”  This conflicts with the two material principals, because how can a unified body, with nothing beyond itself, both act and be acted upon?

One way to resolve this conflict is to think of the two principles as “merely abstract or conceptual” and that the Stoics wanted “to give an account of the material world that does not have to refer to anything outside of Nature in order to explain its movement or development” thus “they are able to say that the material cosmos both acts and is acted upon … itself” (p. 87, Sellars).

The three ways in which two material entities might be mixed together are:

1. juxtaposition
2. fusion
3. total blending

Fusion is where the original two entities cease to exist and a third entity is created.

Total blending is where the original two entities continue to distinctively exist and a third entity is created.

Pneuma or breath is “the active principle in Nature, sometimes identified with God, sometimes with the soul of God” (p. 163, Sellars)

Pneuma has three principle conditions, “reflecting a different level of ‘tension’”

1. cohesion (hexis) – the force that holds physical objects, such as a stone, together.
2. nature (phusis) – the living force, which causes biological organisms to live.
3. soul (psuche) – the principle of life in animals that have powers of perceptions (impressions), movement (impulses) and reproduction. (See p. 91, Sellars)

Sellars states, “It is thus possible to make Stoic physics sound quite modern and thoroughly naturalistic.”  The three levels of tension coincide to levels of life forms and consciousness as well as a division between things that are purely acted upon and things that act as well as a division between things that are acted upon and which can also act.  Thus a rock would only possess cohesion pneuma and would not possess nature or soul and would be acted upon.  Going up the continuum, algae and plants would possess both cohesion and nature pneuma and could act on dirt and rocks.  Animals would have soul pneuma and could act on plants and rocks and even within animals, some animals such as humans might have greater soul pneuma.  Any modern biology class would most likely show simple versus complex lifeforms, not unlike the pneuma principles outlined above.

Two essential beliefs about the Stoic God are: God is not external to Nature, but rather God is Nature.  The other is “the cosmos is a living being” (p. 92-93, Sellars).

The orthodox Stoic belief was that Nature / the cosmos is conscious (see quotes from Zeno and Diogenes Laertius p. 93-94, Sellars).

The Stoic God is a conscious, living being that is Nature.

The Stoic cosmos can be described in a few points.

Point 1: there is nothing but void beyond the cosmos; therefore nothing external to the cosmos orders it: “The Stoics are thoroughgoing naturalists who want to give an account of the movement and order in the cosmos that does not depend on any entity outside the cosmos” (p. 95-96, Sellars).

Point 2: Nature / the cosmos “organizes and regulates itself” (p. 95, Sellars)

Point 3: Nature / the cosmos is a “living organism [and] is also conscious” (p. 95, Sellars)

Point 4: the cosmos is viewed as “a spherical being” and is “a finite cosmos” (p. 96, Sellars)

Point 5: the cosmos is “held together by the breath or pneuma that pervades it” (p. 97, Sellars)

Point 6: “at certain moments, the entire cosmos was dissolved entirely into fire” causing its destruction and birth.

Point 7: The destruction and birth are cyclical.  “The life of the cosmos in each cycle is identical to its predecessor.  The cosmos, governed by reason, has the best possible organization, this is repeated in each cycle.  Thus, there is eternal recurrence … as a single cycle, repeated endlessly” (p. 99, Sellars).

“Whole” or holon “refers to the cosmos.  “All” or pan “refers to both the cosmos and the infinite void surrounding it” (p. 97, Sellars).

Pneuma or breath holds the cosmos together and “is a conscious and rational organizing principal.  It is the soul of the cosmos, analogous to the soul of any other living being” (p. 97, Sellars).

Per the Wikipedia page, the phoenix “is a long-lived bird that cyclically regenerates or is otherwise born again. Associated with the sun, a phoenix obtains new life by arising from the ashes of its predecessor.”  This is an appropriate comparison to the Stoic eternal recurrence, where the cosmos goes through conflagration and birth in a single cycle, repeated endlessly.

Stoic fate is described as “a continuous string of causes, an inescapable order and connection between events” (p. 100, Sellars).

Stoic providence is described as “God, who pervades the entire cosmos, forms the cosmos into a harmonious whole and orders events in a providential manner.  The cosmos is ‘administered by mind and providence’” (p. 100, Sellars).

Fate and providence are reconciled by Stoics who argue that they “are in fact one and the same thing.”  God’s will is an ordered, continuous string of events and furthermore, because “God is supremely good and supremely rational, then there will surely be only one course of action open to him, namely the best and most rational course of action.”  And this “necessary and unalterable order of causes … is providentially arranged by God to be the best possible order” (p. 101, Sellars).

The theory of cosmic sympathy offers that all parts of the cosmos are continually interacting, such as the sun’s charged particles striking atoms in the earth’s atmosphere causing auroras to appear.  “This sympathy between all of the parts of the cosmos is a product of the fact that it is all permeated by breath or pnuema” (p. 103, Sellars).  Therefore, small events can have wide-ranging impacts.

Between Stoic fate, Stoic providence and cosmic sympathy, it would appear human will or agency is limited.  Some would suggest that individual humans have little to no free will and that their fate is entirely determined, regardless of their actions – so why should humans bother acting at all?  This is known as the “lazy argument.”

Chrysippus’ response to the “lazy argument” references two types of fated things.

• Simple fated things are “necessary and [are] a product of the essence of a thing.”  An example would be death – all mortals will die.
• Conjoined fated things are more complex and involve “two types of causes” called internal and external.  External causes would be things external to human nature that would impact the outcome.  Internal causes are things inherent to human nature.

Thus, humans can attempt to influence their fate when they are sick and may die at night.  While dying is an internal cause, dying at night is not a given as the human may call a doctor or take medication, thus influencing the outcome.

The cosmos is mirrored at the human level.  Where the cosmos has pneuma which constitutes God’s soul, the human soul is a fragment of the cosmic pneuma.  Where the cosmos is embodied in matter, so too the human body is a fragment of cosmic matter (see p. 104, Sellars).

The rational human being has pneuma at four levels of tension (p. 105, Sellars):

• hexis – cohesion of the body
• phusis – being alive in most basic biological sense
• psuche – animal faculties of impression and impulse
• logike psuche – rational power of judgement that can intervene between receiving impressions and acting on impulses.

The commanding faculty of the pneuma is called hegemonikon and is comprised of three parts (p. 105, Sellars):

• faculty of impressions; faculty of impulse; faculty of assent
• Humans share the faculties of impression and impulse with animals.
• The faculty that makes humans unique (their nature) is the faculty of assent.

Epictetus Discourses 1.17 - that logic is indispenable

That the art of reasoning is indispensable

Entering the realm of philosophy and learning to live well, it is requisite that the student knows the tools and knows how to use the tools to accomplish an objective.

For this reason, Epictetus notes that "philosophers begin with logic" when teaching their students (v. 6).  He uses an analogy to explain.  "When measuring grain, one begins by examining the measure.  For unless we start off by establishing what a unit of measurement is, and what a balance is, how shall we ever be able to weigh or measure anything?" (v. 6-7).

Therefore, we ought to learn a "full and accurate knowledge of the standard of judgement that we apply in gaining a knowledge of everything else" (8).

To bolster his case for the importance of using learning and using logics, he notes previous philosophers who support this approach: Chrisippus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Antisthenes, Socrates and Xenophon (v. 10-12).

Also, to be able to read and understand previous philosophers, one ought to learn logic so one can interpret what they have said or written.  But even beyond that idea, if one learns logic well and applies it well, one won't even need the use of philosophers who have interpreted Nature, as we ought to be able to do so with applied, sound logic (see v. 15-19).

Furthermore, when someone tries to threaten you, you will be able to see things as they really are; "it isn't what you're threatened with that compels you, but your own judgement that it is better to do this or than than to die" (v. 25).

He concludes with a reminder that there is divinity in each of us and that a portion of god is in each of us.

"If you wish it, you are free; if you wish it, you'll find fault with no one, you'll cast blame on no one, and everything that comes about will do so in accordance with" your own will and god's will (v. 28).